Optimal insurance design of ambiguous risks

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August undefined, 2024

WebOptimal insurance design of ambiguous risks 557 tract when the distribution of losses is ambiguous and the policyholder is ambiguity averse.1 We assume that the policyholder is … WebChristian Gollier, “Optimal insurance design of ambiguous risks”, Economic Theory, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, vol. 57, n. 3, November 2014, pp. 555–576.

Optimal Insurance for a Minimal Expected Retention: The Case of …

http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/by/gollier/optimalAA3.pdf WebWe examine the characteristics of the optimal insurance contract under linear transaction cost and an ambiguous distribution of losses. Under the standard expected utility model, … how many angels are there catholic

EconPapers: Optimal insurance design of ambiguous risks

WebJan 30, 2015 · In this paper, we examine the problem of optimal insurance design with a minimum expected retention constraint, in the case where the insurer is ambiguity … WebMay 11, 2024 · This paper presents analytical representations for an optimal insurance contract under distortion risk measure and in the presence of model uncertainty. We … WebWe examine the characteristics of the optimal insurance contract under linear transaction costs and an ambiguous distribution of losses. Under the standard expected utility model, we know from Arrow (1965) that it contains a straight deductible. In this paper, we assume that the policyholder is ambiguity averse in the sense of Klibanoff et al. (Econometrica … how many angels are there in a legion

Do you trust your insurer? Ambiguity about contract

WebChristian Gollier, “Optimal insurance design of ambiguous risks”, TSE Working Paper, n. 12-303, May 2012, revised January 2013. WebFeb 1, 2015 · My last few clients had not used actuaries in 20 years of Insurance Buying. When they did, the results were transformative, Reducing Premiums Substantially, Safely & Strategically. I am an independent actuarial advisor to insurance buyers with more than 20 years of experience in this field. During this time I have completed over 200 projects for … high pancreatitisWebJan 1, 2012 · Optimal insurance design of ambiguous risks DOI: 10.1007/s00199-014-0845-8 Authors: Christian Gollier Toulouse 1 Capitole University Abstract and Figures We … high pandas

"Web560 C. Gollier The generalization of this result in the case of ambiguity aversion can be summarized as follows. Proposition 2 When τ = 0, the optimal contract entails full insurance, i.e.,I(x) = x for all x. When τ>0, there exists a subset of losses of positive measure G such that I(x) = 0. Proof Whenτ = 0,itiseasytocheckthattheﬁrst-orderconditions(10)and(11)are " - Optimal insurance design of ambiguous risks

Optimal insurance design of ambiguous risks

WebOptimal insurance design of ambiguous risks. Christian Gollier () No 718, IDEI Working Papers from Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. Abstract: We examine the … WebOptimal insurance design of ambiguous risks Christian Gollier1 Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA, University of Toulouse) May 1, 2012 Abstract We examine the …

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WebIn problems of optimal insurance design, Arrow’s classical result on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule holds in a situation where the insurer is a risk-neutral Expected-Utility (EU) maximizer, the insured is a risk-averse EU-maximizer, and the two parties share the same probabilistic beliefs about the realizations of the … WebChristian Gollier, “Optimal insurance design of ambiguous risks”, Economic Theory, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, vol. 57, n. 3, November 2014, pp. 555–576. Optimal insurance design …

WebFeb 1, 2024 · We study optimal insurance demand for a risk- and ambiguity-averse consumer under ambiguity about contract nonperformance. Ambiguity aversion lowers …

WebWe examine the characteristics of the optimal insurance contract under linear transaction cost and an ambiguous distribution of losses. Under the standard expected utility model, … WebWe analyze the effect of ambiguous loss probabilities on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information. We characterize equilibria under actuarially fair pricing with preferences that are second-order ambiguity averse (have smooth indifference curves). We also show existence of uniqueness of the second-best contracts and provide a …

WebMar 21, 2016 · Ambiguity in Optimal Insurance Design Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity, rather than risk, is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting and that …

WebFeb 1, 2024 · We study optimal insurance demand for a risk- and ambiguity-averse consumer under ambiguity about contract nonperformance. Ambiguity aversion lowers optimal insurance demand and the... high pao2 on abgWebOptimal insurance design of ambiguous risks Christian Gollier1 Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA, University of Toulouse) January 21, 2013 Abstract We examine the characteristics of the optimal insurance contract under linear transaction cost and an ambiguous distribution of losses. Under the standard expected utility model, we know high par aquarium lightsWebOptimal insurance design of ambiguous risks Article Full-text available Jan 2012 Christian Gollier We examine the characteristics of the optimal insurance contract under linear transaction... high parathormoneWebOptimal insurance design of ambiguous risks 557 tract when the distribution of losses is ambiguous and the policyholder is ambiguity averse.1 … high parathyrin intactWebOct 9, 2014 · We also show that the policyholder’s ambiguity aversion may have the counterintuitive effect to reduce the optimal insurance coverage of an ambiguous risk. … how many ancient orbs for headhunterWeboptimal insurance coverage. The intuition suggests that it should increase the demand for insurance, but we show that this is not true in general. In particular, the demand for … how many angels are there in evangelionhttp://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/by/gollier/optimalAA3.pdf how many angels are there in christianity